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AFDC Agriculture, Forestry and Development Company
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
CC Central Committee
DAF-IC Development of Agriculture, Forestry and Industry Company
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
LDC Least Developed Countries
LFNC Lao Front for National Construction
LPDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic
LPF Lao Patriotic Front
LPRP Lao People's Revolutionary Party
LWU Lao Women’s Union
MADC Mountainous Area Development Corporation
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
RYU Revolutionary Youth Union
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Vientiane between 17–19 No-
vember 2014. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. Lao PDR 
A. Historical Background 
Laos is a small, landlocked, mountainous country 
in Southeast Asia. As a country, it shares borders 
with Myanmar and the People’s Republic of China 
to the Northwest, Vietnam to the East, Cambodia 
to the South and Thailand to the West. 
Laos endured multiple serious political upheavals 
throughout the 1940s and 50s. During World War 
II, it was occupied by the Japanese, as was the 
rest of French Indochina. Just before Japan's sur-
render in 1945, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Pra-
bang declared independence from France. Under 
the Free Lao banner, an independent government 
was formed by the union of Vientiane, Champas-
sak and Luang Prabang. The anti-French Free Lao 
government overthrew the King and only upon 
accepting the Free Lao constitution was he sub-
sequently enthroned as the monarch. The relent-
less French forces fought back and succeeded in 
re-occupying Laos a year later. Three years after, 
in 1954, Laos was made a member of the French 
union and its independence was formally recog-
nised by France. The country was ruled by pro-
Western governments until 1957 when Prince 
Souvanna Phouma led the first coalition govern-
ment. However, this same government was bro-
ken up a year later and leaders of the communist 
Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) leaders were put into 
prison. The communist insurgency resumed and 
in 1960, a coup d'etat took place in Vientiane, 
headed by a paratroop captain Kong Le who de-
manded that a neutralist government be formed 
to end the fighting. The neutralist government 
was formed under Prince Souvanna Phouna, but 
rightist forces led by General Phoumi Nosavan 
later that year replaced it. In response, Kong Le 
and the LPF formed an alliance, which was sup-
ported by North Laos and the Soviet Union, while 
the United States supported Phoumi Nosavan's 
rightist regime.  
During the second Geneva Conference held in 
1961-62, an agreement was reached for the inde-
pendence and neutrality of Laos. Peace did not 
prevail as discord arose soon after and civil war 
started again with the superpowers supporting 
different parties. The political struggles between 
communists, pro-Western forces and neutralists 
continued. The coalition government formed 
from the three parties suffered a sharp decline in 
1975 when communists claimed victories in Laos 
and Cambodia. The King was forced to give up 
his throne, and the communist Lao People's De-
mocratic Republic (LPDR) was established. Com-
munist forces took control of the government, 
ending the six-century old monarchy. A strict so-
cialist regime was instituted with the media com-
ing under the control of the government and the 
private sector replaced by state enterprises and 
cooperatives. A large number of former govern-
ment and military personnel were arrested and 
put into re-education camps. The enforced politi-
cal control as well as the worsening economic 
conditions forced many Lao people to seek 
refuge in other countries. It is estimated that close 
to 10% of the population left the country and 
from among these, 250,000 went to the United 
States. 
In the mid 1980s, the government decentralised 
control and encouraged private enterprise. The 
country began opening up to the world in the 
1990s. Most of the re-education camps were 
closed and a number of reintegration assistance 
programmes were implemented by the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and other international NGOs to facilitate Lao 
refugees’ repatriation to their homeland. The Lao 
economy supported a return to family farming 
and private enterprise in some areas. The gov-
ernment also reduced subsidies to inefficient 
state-run enterprises and pursued foreign invest-
ment from capitalist nations. Poor communication 
facilities, inadequate transportation and an ineffi-
cient distribution system continue to hamper ef-
forts towards modernisation and development.  
Aided by foreign-led infrastructure projects, eco-
nomic growth recovered from negative rates reg-
istered in the 1980s, to more promising rates in 
the 1990s. Laos became a member of ASEAN in 
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1997. Over the last ten years, total government 
revenue increased from 11% to over 19% of GDP, 
due mainly to revenues derived from mining and 
hydropower. The effect on the Lao people de-
pended on how the government uses the rev-
enue. Lao remains one of the poorest and least 
developed countries in the world. 
The President of Laos is Choummaly Saignason, 
the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) 
leader, Choummaly Saignason, who was re- 
elected in the 2011 elections. In the same elec-
tions, Thongsing Thammavong, a Politburo mem-
ber of the Central Committee of the LPRP was 
appointed as the country's prime minister. The 
next elections are due in 2016.  
B. Current Challenges 
❖ The paradox of a democratic republic. In spite 
of its desire to be integrated with the international 
community for economic reasons, the structure of 
the ruling LPRP remains typical of communist par-
ties of the former Soviet states. The Political Bu-
reau, which currently comprises ten members, is 
elected from and by the Central Committee (CC) 
of the LPRP at each LPRP Congress. The Central 
Committee has 51 members. Since the formation 
of the Lao PDR in Dec 1975, all political power 
has been monopolised by the LPRP. Political dis-
sent of even the most limited kind (in the form of 
political study groups, or small peaceful public 
demonstrations) is quickly squelched. Not only is 
the LPRP the only avenue of political and social 
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Laos By Numbers 
Official Name:    Lao People’s Democratic Republic  (1975 – present)                         
Capital:      Vientiane (Viangchan)                                     
Area:     236,800 sq km                                          
Population:    6.8 million (country); 810,000 (Vientiane)                                
Ethnic Groups:    Lao (55%), Khmou (11%), Hmong (8%), minor ethnic group (26%) [2005 census]                         
Religion:    Buddhist (67%), Christian (1.5%), other (31.5%) [2005 census]                                    
Language:   Lao (official), French, English, various ethnic languages                                 
  
Currency:    Lao Kip (official), United States Dollar {de facto}                                   
GDP (PPP):   $20.78 billion [2013 est.]                                
GDP Per Capita (PPP): $3,100 [2013 est.]               
GDP Real Growth Rate: 8.3% [2013 est.]            
Labour Force:   Agriculture (73.1%), Industry (6.1%), Services (20.6%)                           
Literacy:    72.7% (whole); 82.5% (male); 63.2% (female)                                     
Life Expectancy:  63.51 years (whole); 61.54 years (male); 65.56 years                         
     (female) [2014 est.]                                                    
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
advancement, it is also the principal one. The 
Buddhist monastic order (the Sangha) presents a 
limited alternative avenue for social mobility 
through education, and wealth accumulation pro-
vides another. However, the LPRP keeps a close 
control over the Sangha, and anything more than 
a small family business requires the proprietor to 
seek political protection through the patronage of 
a prominent LPRP member.  
Although undergirded by a Marxist-Leninist ide-
ology, Laos is an authoritarian one-party state, in 
which the LPRP presides over a transitional mar-
ket economy. The LPRP still retains control of a 
number of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that it 
keeps for reasons of national security, but it wel-
comes foreign direct investment (FDI).  
The LPRP permeates and controls four key institu-
tions in the country: the government, the bureau-
cracy, mass organisations, and the military. In all 
four, leading figures are LPRP members. LPRP 
cells operate in all institutions, and there is active 
recruitment of promising young people into the 
LPRP, membership of which is by invitation only. 
Anyone who is not an LPRP member fears the 
scrutiny of those who are. Civil servants at all lev-
els are reluctant to make decisions without refer-
ring matters to their superiors. Doing nothing can 
be passed off as wisely studying a proposal; mak-
ing decisions opens one to criticism and censure. 
Relatively minor decisions, therefore, are left to 
senior officials. As a result, the civil service is slug-
gish and unresponsive, and the best way to get 
things done is through personal and political con-
tacts with senior LPRP members. The functioning 
of the bureaucracy thus depends upon the oil of 
politics, personal relationships, and compensato-
ry payments.   2
The only mass organisations permitted in Laos are 
those directed by the LPRP. These number just 
four: the Lao Front for National Construction 
(LFNC), the Federation of Lao Trade Unions, the 
Lao Women’s Union, and the Revolutionary Youth 
Union. Local peasant associations are also toler-
ated. The Lao trade union movement is tightly 
controlled by the LPRP, and no free, worker-or-
ganised unions are allowed to operate. Probably 
the most active mass organisation is the Lao 
Women’s Union (LWU), which holds meetings and 
workshops for women across the country. In a 
country that is still overwhelmingly male-domi-
nated, the LWU provides the only opportunity for 
women to organise and press for recognition. In 
so doing, it operates as the closest Laos has to a 
genuine pressure group. The Revolutionary Youth 
Union (RYU) is active in schools, where it serves as 
a recruiting ground for the LPRP. Though it organ-
ises youth activities, it serves principally as a 
means of political indoctrination of young Lao.  
❖ The paradox of reform. Tensions exist between 
political orthodoxy and economic reform. Any 
political in-fighting between the conservatives 
with revolutionary credentials, who were often not 
very well educated, and the technocrats with 
Western training has seen the former triumph. 
The latter are often expelled on the basis of ideo-
logical shortcomings or corruption. Despite the 
government’s commitment to greater political 
and economic reform, the human rights situation 
in the country remains poor. Amnesty In-
ternational reported torture, harsh prison condi-
tions and religious persecution among Lao dissi-
dents. While international offenders who cross the 
line can be freed through powerful lobby groups 
and diplomacy, local prisoners have no recourse 
at all to justice.  
  
There is a persistent gap between policy and 
practice. It is often observed in Laos that policy as 
it appears on paper bears little resemblance to 
implementation on the ground. Committees are 
formed but never meet, funds are established but 
remain empty, fines are levied but are not en-
forced.  3
Even as the government tries to restructure its 
military-controlled state enterprises such as the 
Mountainous Area Development Corporation 
(MADC), the Agriculture, Forestry and Develop-
ment Company (AFDC) and the Development of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Industry Company (DAF-
IC), the economic power of the military remains 
considerable, protected by the political influence 
 H. Holly and P. Petit, 'Introduction: The Study of the State in Laos,' Asian Studies Review 37.4 (2013), 417–432,2
 Ibid.3
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it exercises within the party. It has been observed 
that the attempt by government to limit the 
wildlife trade and protect the environment pro-
vides a case study of the failure of legal measures 
to counter illegal and corrupt activities.  4
❖ The paradox of aid in education. Education is 
recognisably the key to economic and social de-
velopment in developing countries. The Lao gov-
ernment's Education Sector Development Plan 
for 2011-2015 reveals that five years of new in-
vestments are planned to be entirely funded by 
external sources. The official position of Laos is to 
continue its financial dependence on foreign aid. 
Laos' dependence on both the ideas and funding 
of the donors results in a suboptimal outcome for 
foreign aid mainly because of a lack of partner-
ship and ownership on the part of the beneficia-
ries. Negative effects are mostly masked in official 
evaluations, which tend to be positive. The Educa-
tion Sector Development Plan, for instance, 
boasts that the literacy rate rose from 74.4% to 
81.73% from 2006 to 2010. This statement is not 
immediately accompanied by the fact that ODA 
to Laos' education increased by 2.72% annually 
during the same period. This means that the 
achievement in improving literacy by 1.46% an-
nually is hardly impressive compared to the an-
nual growth rate of educational aid.   5
Only rarely do the negative aspects of depen-
dency appear in official documents. An OECD 
report cautions that the school enrolment rate of 
92.7% as of 2009 may not be accurate. If the high 
dropout and repetition rates were factored in, the 
enrolment rate would fall to 71.1%. This is con-
firmed by other international reports by UNESCO. 
Other documents are similarly eager to evaluate 
the effectiveness of various aid projects from the 
partnership among donors, but not from the con-
straints faced by or requests on the part of the 
recipients.  
Education policies and practices in Laos remains 
in a state of flux. When a key donor country takes 
over as the key contributor to Laos due to an in-
ternational political or economic alliance, the 
school system changes in tandem. When the 
French came, they introduced a western academ-
ic calendar that ran from September through 
June. Then, universal primary education became 
available with the introduction of communism in 
1975. The Lao People's Democratic Republic 
started to replace the French system of elite edu-
cation with mass education. Help from China and 
the Soviet Union in terms of finances was instru-
mental in shaping the reform model even if the 
shortage of teachers and other materials kept 
their goals from being fully achieved.  
Uncritical transfers of Western-style modern edu-
cation systems are more likely to result in half-
hearted acceptance or neglect by the recipients, 
rather than to be treated as a valuable opportuni-
ty. Cultural and religious obstacles are typical, but 
so are practical obstacles like mismanagement. 
This lack of correspondence between the goals of 
foreign aid and the needs of local people is fur-
ther exacerbated by the distortion of data by the 
recipient organisations to impress donors. The 
outcome is the worsening inequality in education 
due to the monopoly of the benefits of foreign 
aid by the rich and powerful while the majority of 
people only passively participate in the opportu-
nity to educate their children. Foreign aid, under 
such circumstances become self-defeating and 
worsens rather than improves equality of oppor-
tunity gained through education.  
❖ The paradox of gender. There is a wide gap 
between the literacy rate for males versus females 
in Laos. This is one of several anomalies that exist 
in Lao society. The Lao Constitution specifically 
states that girls and women have equal rights and 
responsibilities as citizens, including the right to a 
free education. The powerful Lao Women’s Union 
is represented on every major political body in 
the country. Many cultural groups in Laos have 
matrilineal land rights. Many women with high 
social status have powerful positions in Lao politi-
cal and educational circles. Others who were ed-
ucated abroad, such as in France, have a height-
ened social and political awareness of gender 
and citizenship. In addition, all the foreign inter-
 M. Stuart-Fox, 'The Political Culture of Corruption in the Lao PDR’, Asian Studies Review 30 (2006), 59–75.4
 D. Kim and M-K Jeong, 'Insufficient partnership, ineffective foreign aid, and public education in Laos’, KEDI Journal of Educational Policy 5
10.1 (2013), 173 -193.
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ventions in education in Laos included gender 
equity, gender inclusiveness, and gender aware-
ness as part of their programme objectives. Yet, 
there is still an enormous gulf between the ap-
parent guarantee of full citizenship for women 
and women’s actual lived experience of that 
guarantee.  6
Lao society is undergoing a rapid change in terms 
of economic structures and new influences from 
outside, including new technologies, and new 
relationships with other countries. Many of these 
changes are increasingly affecting ethnic minority 
people in more remote areas, yet with few excep-
tions, girls and women are still not participating 
very actively in these changes. It is unlikely that 
this situation can remain if Lao PDR is to progress 
according to their stated objectives of ‘Education 
for All’, an end of poverty, and equal rights. If girls 
and ethnic minority groups are to participate in 
the new economic mechanism, they will need to 
be educated as well.  
❖ The paradox of cultural preservation. Cultural 
preservation and appreciation of traditional val-
ues and heritage is central to the psyche of the 
Lao people. Oftentimes, the act of cultural preser-
vation ironically leads to cultural loss and an aver-
sion for change and economic progress. 
As a case in point, in the royal city of Luang Pra-
bang (famous for its 34 Buddhist monasteries, 
orange-robed monks and colonial architecture), 
state programmes, UNESCO projects and cos-
mopolitan gentrification are fostered in parallel. 
To many Lao, the making of heritage here hijacks 
history. Luang Prabang’s charm is seen by them to 
be threatened by the assault of Asian and Euro-
pean tourism. At the heart of most of the Lao cul-
tural experts’ ire is the vanquish of the Luang Pra-
bang spirit under the threat of tourism. According 
to them, what prevails is a western romanticized 
version of Buddhism, and colonial conceptions of 
traditional life, conveying nostalgia for an ideal-
ized Luang Prabang. Even the tak baad, or morn-
ing ritual of giving alms to the monks, has be-
come a metaphor of cultural erosion, with tourists 
encroaching upon the symbolic relationship that 
had existed between monks and villagers for cen-
turies.  The majority of Lao would prefer that eco7 -
nomic and social progress is achieved without the 
erosion of culture and values they have observed 
in other Southeast Asian states. 
❖ The precarious nature of civil society. Civil soci-
ety in Laos has never been the same since the 
country’s most distinguished NGO leader was 
arrested at a police checkpoint in the capital, Vi-
entiane, in 2012 and has not been seen since. 
Sombath Somphone founded the Participatory 
Development Training Centre (PADETC) in 1996 
with the aim of fostering sustainable, equitable 
and self-reliant development in Laos. Mr Som-
bath, who  won the prestigious Magsaysay Award 
in 2005 is often regarded as Asia’s answer to a 
Nobel Peace Laureate. His disappearance has 
triggered an unprecedented  flood of in-
ternational dismay. Foreign NGOs, Asian parlia-
mentarians and Western governments have 
raised their concerns with the Lao authorities. 
'Missing' posters have popped up in Vientiane, 
appealing for word of his whereabouts. Farther-
reaching campaigns to draw attention to this case 
have been circulating on Facebook, Twitter and 
Avaaz. The UN Human Rights Council in Geneva 
has also expressed deep worry over his disap-
pearance. 
Eight days before Mr Sombath’s abduction the 
government of  Laos deported Anne-Sophie 
Grindoz, the director of Helvetas, a Swiss NGO. 
Her offence was in writing a personal appeal ad-
dressed to development partners and donors, 
which then became public: We are working in a 
challenging environment: This is a country gov-
erned by a single-party regime, where there is 
little space for meaningful democratic debate. 
Indeed there is far less 'space' in tiny Laos than in 
its Communist neighbours, China and Vietnam. 
Ms Grindoz went on to complain that elements of 
civil society in the capital, Lao and international 
alike, are so cowed by the restrictions they face as 
 C. Fox, 'No place for girls? Gender, ethnicity and citizenship education in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic’, Compare, 33.3 (2003), 6
401-412.
 D. Berliner,'Multiple nostalgias: the fabric of heritage in Luang Prabang (Lao PDR)’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 18 7
(2012), 769-786. 
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to be, in effect, stifled by a system of self-censor-
ship. 
Several other NGO workers have fled Laos since 
then, in fear for their own safety. Government offi-
cials have offered only a deadpan reply: foreign-
ers must abide by the rules and the country’s con-
stitution.  8
Many individual members of Laos' civil society are 
critical of the regime’s big-dam projects and large 
foreign-owned plantations that tend to margin-
alise small farmers. However unlike NGOs in 
Cambodia and Vietnam, Lao NGOs have not 
come out officially against the construction of the 
Xayaburi dam project. This is because it is widely 
known that Lao citizens with unpopular views 
have a way of vanishing. In 2007, Sompawn Khan-
tisouk, the owner and manager of an eco-tourism 
lodge and a vocal critic of the proliferation of 
Chinese-owned plantations that have expanded 
by expropriating land from smallholders, disap-
peared. He has never been seen since. On anoth-
er occasion, Thongluon Sisoulith, the foreign min-
ister and deputy prime minister, welcomed partic-
ipants of an international NGO forum warmly and 
seemed to take a positive view of their involve-
ment in development activities. Yet according to 
several international NGO workers present during 
the forum, plain clothes agents could be seen 
copying notes, filming the forum’s local partici-
pants and creating an intimidating atmosphere. 
Several Lao speakers were so alarmed that they 
withdrew from the event. Not only are such stories 
of incidents repeatedly being circulated among 
foreigners in the country but they have also 
reached the ears of the young Lao who prefer to 
mind their own business than get involved in so-
cial advocacy or  critique of government policies. 
C. Insights from the Vientiane Lab 
❖ International aid agencies are more eager to 
see Laos develop rapidly than the Lao.     
Laos is well placed for economic growth, having 
maintained 7-8% growth annually in the last few 
years and having secured foreign direct invest-
ment in hydropower, mining, copper, gold and 
timber. The government’s stated ambition is to 
have the country graduate from the United Na-
tion’s list of Least Developed Countries (LDC) by 
2020. From the perspective of the UNDP, they are 
unlikely to meet all the goals, but there is a clear 
path to achieve targeted minimum outcomes. 
The government has also made efforts for the 
country to be known to the region by organising 
regional conferences and even hosting the 
ASEAN games. As the country moves towards 
economic development through the setting up of 
seven special economic zones and attracting for-
eign direct investments (FDI), there are concerns 
that the pace of development may be too fast and 
in the process, important aspects will be over-
looked in the pursuit of perceived development. 
The fear is that traditions will be forgotten and 
forest coverage reduced. One of the ministry ad-
visors we spoke with explicitly said that Laos need 
not rush to be developed and should learn from 
the other ASEAN countries. It should not make 
the same mistakes.  
Many donor countries and international organisa-
tions are evidently more anxious than the Lao 
themselves for the country to be developed. The 
perplexing question is whether the Lao people 
actually want their country to be developed that 
quickly. Many believe that radical change is not 
the best way forward. Instead, understanding and 
coping with the existing situations, while contem-
plating the move forward, would be a more pru-
dent decision. This means that the resultant situa-
tion is one of inertia and indecision. Change then, 
can only be effected at a small scale with commu-
nities that take ownership of foreign help and 
support. 
❖ Geography poses a challenge to development, 
but natural resources, if used responsibly, could 
prove Laos’ salvation. 
Geography is a challenge for Laos. The popula-
tion is unevenly spread across the country with 
the majority living along the Mekong River and 
some 50 ethnic groups living in the hills. This 
 T. F., ‘Gone missing: Civil society in Laos’, The Economist, 8 Jan 2013, accessed 9 Jan 2015, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/8
2013/01/civil-society-laos
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translates into high unit cost for amenities and 
hence, places a huge burden on government 
provisions. Up in the north, cluster bombs left 
behind from the Laos war are taxing on develop-
ments. Apart from the fact that land needs to be 
cleared before developments can take place, the 
ordnances are dangerous to the general commu-
nity, as children unknowingly play with them and 
people also risk their lives to recover the scrap 
metal within. 
Laos is rich in natural resources. The current de-
velopment model necessitates resource exploita-
tion (for instance in mining, logging and hy-
dropower) and the challenge is to ensure fair dis-
tribution of revenue received and also the sus-
tainability of resource exploitation. Whether such 
endowed resources constitute a curse or a bless-
ing depends on whether the revenue goes to 
common benefit or only to the elite and powerful. 
The Lao government depends totally on their 
natural resources to fund their national budget for 
the next few years. There is risk here as revenue is 
uncertain due to changes in prices of commodi-
ties (gold, copper). Laos does not as yet have a 
rainy day fund. 
Attention has also been directed to food security 
and green initiatives. However, contract farming, 
mining and logging continue to negatively impact 
the environment. Sustainable growth is a concern. 
Even though regulations are in place to manage 
environmental issues, it is difficult to control the 
illegal activities in mining investments given the 
political ethos and structure of power. Again, ef-
forts in these areas have to be well directed with 
cooperation from individuals who have ownership 
of the issues rather than dealt with at a national, 
political level. 
❖ Fresh blood needs to tread carefully.     
The political stability of Laos at this point in time is 
both a boon and an impediment. While the polit-
buro will continue to be re-elected for lack of any 
opposition, changes and social engagement ef-
forts continue to be stalled because of political 
orthodoxy. There are hopes for younger party 
members who have received a good education 
abroad via foreign scholarships. As they ascend 
the ranks, they should be able to bring new per-
spectives that will be beneficial to the country. 
Outside the LPRP, a handful of social advocates 
work quietly and independently, without much 
support from their peers or society at large.  
Laos, as a country, suffers very much from a brain 
drain. Educated people prefer to work and live 
overseas as they are unable to see a future in 
Laos. Currently, the youth in the cities do not en-
gage in national development conversations as 
they were brought up to believe that certain is-
sues and topics, especially with reference to the 
government and policies, are off-limits. 
A nexus between the young political leaders who 
are more progressive and the social advocates 
who are working towards a review and update of 
policies and regulations can exist, and it will be a 
matter of time. There is a clear conviction on the 
part of both groups that communities should own 
their own issues and attempt to resolve them by 
themselves rather than waiting for the govern-
ment to act on their behalf. 
❖ A culture of trust between the social and gov-
ernment sectors is needed to optimise in-
ternational resources.  
The government has continued to tighten control 
on NGOs working in the country and has man-
dated that NGOs sign an annual memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) before they can carry out 
work for their organisation. The new MOUs with 
the government greatly hamper programme im-
plementation, as the MOU terms are stringent, 
and approval can take a long time to come. This 
could mean that by the time it comes, the NGO 
would have very little time and budget left to car-
ry out their projects for the year. There is also a 
quota imposed on the number of foreigners al-
lowed in an organisation. 
To navigate the system and drive initiatives, the 
NGOs comply with as many government regula-
tions as they need to, and employ intelligent 
methods to collaborate with the government, 
including engaging in dialogues and learning 
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how to deal with the nuances. So as not to get on 
the wrong side of the approving authorities, 
NGOs are very cautious when it comes to sharing 
information beyond those they trust, for fear of 
the consequences of misinterpreted content. As 
NGOs are in the country to support social devel-
opment, it would help if a stronger understanding 
and trust be built so that resources can be opti-
mised all round. The NGO representatives will 
then not be frustrated in their efforts and at the 
same time, the government can work more close-
ly to ensure the delivery of services to communi-
ties most in need of basic help.  The resolution of 9
this might have to depend on when younger par-
ty leaders come of age and take up  high-level 
positions in the various ministries. 
❖ Laos’ lack of an educated labour force is 
stalling its development. 
The lack of human resource and skilled labour is a 
major challenge in Laos. Skill sets are limited and 
people are employed based on relationships and 
their ability to communicate in basic English. 
Even for graduates, opportunities in schools are 
limited. Upon joining the Ministries, they are un-
able to meet the required standards and have to 
be sent for additional training.  
There is no system in place to ensure more skilled 
workers are produced to meet the demand of 
industry. Some of the social advocates we spoke 
to believe that quality teachers as well as technol-
ogy will help to improve the situation. 
The FDI that the government brings in is not sig-
nificantly increasing employment opportunities or 
the transfer of knowledge. The Chinese investors, 
for instance, tend to bring in Chinese nationals for 
their projects, and these often involve high tech-
nology equipment which the locals are unable to 
operate. 
The median age of the Lao population is 19 years. 
The key challenge for the country is to get the 
basics of healthcare and nutrition right among the 
very young, and provide education for those in 
the cities as well as rural areas. Job creation for 
youth employment is crucial, as is the creation of 
opportunities for local ownership of initiatives 
and having government departments work close-
ly with foreign organisations to ensure that na-
tional objectives are met. 
 D. Kim and M-K Jeong, 'Insufficient partnership, ineffective foreign aid, and public education in Laos’, 173 -193.9
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
 
ARDA Language Centre. Vientiane, 19 November 2014. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Lao PDR. Vientiane, 18 November 2014. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore. Singapore, 8 May 2014. 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Lao PDR. Vientiane, 17 November 2014. 
Ministry of National Resources and Environment, Lao PDR. Vientiane, 17 November 2014. 
National Assembly of Lao PDR. Vientiane, 17 November 2014. 
Population Services International. Vientiane, 19 November 2014. 
Purple Sky Network Foundation. Vientiane, 18 November 2014.  
 
School for Ethnic and Gifted Students. Vientiane, 18 November 2014.  
 
United Nations. Vientiane, 18 November 2014. 
United Nations Development Programme. Vientiane, 18 November 2014. 
World Education. Vientiane, 19 November 2014. 
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ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
1Commercial
1
Government
7
Nonprofit
3
Total Organisations Interviewed: 12
VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Laos?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
 now? Five years from now? 
4)  How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
 from when it first began operations in Laos? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
 goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
 your current collaborations?  
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such  
 relationships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
 been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
 skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to  
 succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
 there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—  
 look like to you? 
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16) What skills and resources do Lao leaders need to better serve their society?  
17)  The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as 'the practice of creating sustainable  
 value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.' Are there 
 any remarkable individuals in Laos whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your  
 current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives?  
 Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for social-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
 to lower  dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Laos differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? What 
 does Laos have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities  
 actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing Laos?  
25) How is Laos different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the next 
 five years?  
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